Exports and productivity selection effects for Dutch firms by Kox, Henk L.M. & Rojas Romasgosa, Hugo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Exports and productivity selection
effects for Dutch firms
Henk L.M. Kox and Hugo Rojas Romasgosa
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
1. July 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24390/
MPRA Paper No. 24390, posted 12. August 2010 21:05 UTC
Exports and productivity selection e¤ects
for Dutch rms
Henk L.M. Kox
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Hugo Rojas-Romagosa
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
July 2010
Abstract
This study presents recently available data on the microstructure of Dutch exports and the
relation between export participation and productivity at the rm and establishment-level. We test
whether recent theories of international trade with heterogeneous rms can explain the patterns in
the Dutch data. We nd signicant evidence that rms self-select into export participation, even
after controlling for sector and rm-specic characteristics. In general, only the most productive
Dutch rms participate in exports and foreign direct investment. In addition, we do not nd
evidence for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis, even when controlling for the rms distance to
the international productivity frontier.
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1 Introduction
The international trade literature used to pay no attention to individual rm characteristics. The as-
sumed trading agent was modelled at best as a representative rm. This approach was radically changed
by the empirical research of Bernard and Jensen (1995; 1999). These authors analyzed microeconomic
rm-level data for the US and found signicant economic performance di¤erences between exporting
and non-exporting rms. Firms that exported appeared to be more productive, larger, more capital
intensive and they paid higher wages. The ensuing trade literature on heterogeneous rms expanded
with empirical studies that conrmed these ndings for other countries. Two hypotheses have been
formulated to explain the productivity premium of exporters. In the learning-by-exporting hypothesis,
rms that engage in international trade become more productive after they begin to export.1 The sec-
ond hypothesis is self-selection. Only the most productive rms can overcome trade costs (i.e. sunk and
xed foreign market entry costs) and become exporters.2 Both hypotheses are not mutually exclusive,
but most studies have found strong evidence to support the self-selection hypothesis, and weak evidence
on learning-by-exporting.3
In this paper we use Dutch rm and establishment-level data to analyze whether exporting rms
follow the international pattern drawn by this literature. Since this is the rst study to test the
predictions of the heterogenous rms theory for the Netherlands, we want to investigate whether Dutch
exporting rms are indeed more productive than non-exporting rms, whether or not they self-select
into the export market and whether or not they experience learning-by-exporting e¤ects. Although
we follow the general methodology employed by other empirical studies, we add new elements to the
empirical analysis that so far have had limited attention. First, we diverge from the common way
to measure export self-selection by a standard OLS test. Instead, we use a latent-variable model in
combination with probit regressions so that stochastic elements in the export decision can better be
taken into account. Second, we extend the analysis to the Dutch services sector, while the majority
of available studies for other countries only focuses on the manufacturing industry. Third, we include
market structure as a determinant of the internationalisation decisions by rms. Finally, we use distance
to the technological frontier in testing the learning-by-exporting hypothesis.
We use microeconomic data provided by Statistics Netherlands at the rm-level (SFGO database)
and also at the establishment-level (PS database).4 The richness of the dataset implies that we do not
have to impose or assume a particular distribution of rms. The data cover a wide range of the total rm
1This was the initial common assumption in the 1990s. See for example, World Bank (1993; 1997), Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and Evenson and Westphal (1995).
2The most inuential paper is by Melitz (2003), who introduced rm-heterogeneity in a Krugman-type trade model.
In his framework only the most e¢ cient rms can overcome xed entry-costs in foreign markets and become exporters.
When these entry-costs (which include non-tari¤ barriers and sunk operation costs) are reduced, exporting rms expand.
Low-productivity domestic rms without exports exit the market, as the expanding export rms drive up domestic factor
prices. The outcome is an aggregate increase in productivity. Other theoretical papers have followed and extended the
results by Melitz (e.g. Bernard et al., 2003; Helpman et al., 2004; Baldwin, 2005; Yeaple, 2005; Bernard et al., 2007; Melitz
and Ottaviano, 2008; Chaney, 2008). For instance, Helpman et al. (2004) extend the analysis to MNEs and suggest that
the sunk costs required to become a MNE are higher than to become and exporter. Thus, MNEs are even more productive
than purely exporting rms.
3Literature surveys are presented by Bernard et al. (2007), Wagner (2007) and the International Study Group on
Exports and Productivity (2008).
4The SFGO is complemented by the SFKO database, which is a sample of small rms. The SFKO, however, has less
balance sheet information and no expansion factor variable to make the database representative of the whole population
of small rms. Thus, our rm-level results refer to large rms, even though we do analyse small establishments using the
PS database.
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and establishment distribution so that we can test rm heterogeneity across several dimensions: produc-
tivity, xed-capital intensity, sales, value added, average wages, received subsidies, multinational-rm
a¢ liation, innovation inputs, and human capital. Our primary focus is on productivity heterogeneity,
but we use some of the other dimensions of rm heterogeneity as control variables. Throughout our
analysis we divide the sample between manufacturing and services rms. The comparison of both sectors
reveals a number of interesting distinctions. In particular, both sectors present signicant di¤erences
concerning export participation and export intensity.
The rst set of econometric tests deals with the predicted presence of productivity premia for
exporting and FDI-making rms. Our results using probit regressions conrm the by now standard
ndings of the literature. We nd signicant performance di¤erences between purely domestic rms,
exporting rms and rms with a¢ liation to a multinational enterprise (MNE) for the Netherlands.
Moreover, the type of product competition in the rms domestic market has an important impact on
the export-productivity link. Establishments in industries with homogeneous products and strong cost-
based competition are found to have signicantly higher productivity premia compared to non-exporters
than establishments in industries with more product di¤erentiation and less cost-based competition.
The second set of tests is about the predicted dynamic implications (ex-ante or ex-post productivity
di¤erences for exporters) of the heterogeneous-rms trade models. First, we nd robust evidence in
support of the self-selection hypothesis. This result is in accordance with studies conducted for other
countries.5 We also investigated whether learning-by-exporting is an additional source of productivity
gains after the start of exports, but no signicant learning-by-exporting productivity gains were found.
Finally, we also found that such export-learning e¤ects not even existed after controlling for the learning
potential of individual rms, proxied by the rm-level distance to the international productivity frontier
at the industry level.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and some stylised facts describing
rm characteristics by their internationalisation type. The following section conducts the econometric
testing of the productivity premia for exporters and MNEs using probit regressions. Section 4 presents
the market structure indicator and how it a¤ects the productivity premia. In section 5 we test the self-
selection hypothesis and in section 6 the learning-by-exporting hypothesis where we include distance
to the international frontier as an explanatory variable. Section 7 concludes.
2 The rm-level structure of Dutch exports: stylised facts
The recent theory on trade with heterogeneous rms was triggered by a number of stylised facts that
did not match with the then prevailing trade theory. We present the corresponding stylised facts
for the Netherlands, showing data on the skewed distribution of exports and the di¤erences between
exporting and non-exporting rms, separately for manufacturing industry and services. We also depict
the di¤erences between purely domestic rms, exporting rms and rms a¢ liated with multinationals.
5 In Kox et al. (2010) and Rojas-Romagosa (2010) we replicate the ISGEP methodology and nd comparable results
for the Netherlands with respect to the other 14 countries of the group.
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2.1 Data sources
Our empirical research is based on data produced by Statistics Netherlands at two aggregation levels:
individual establishments or plants (bedrijfseenheid) and rm level data. We use both types of data,
because each allows to address di¤erent aspect of decision making. For rm-level data we use SFGO
data (Statistiek Financiën Grote Ondernemingen) and for the establishment level we draw on the PS
dataset (Productiestatistieken).
 Firm-level data: SFGO (Statistiek Financiën Grote Ondernemingen). The SFGO database only
includes rms with a balance sheet total of more than e23 million. The rms in this category
must le their annual reports each year. This database has a wealth of information, including data
on capital stocks. Using data for the period 1997-2005 we have at maximum nine observations
per rm. For about two-third of the rms we have 8 or 9 observations. For about 17% of all rms
we have less than ve annual observations due to entry and exit dynamics. In total, there are
2440 di¤erent rms in the database. The number of annual observations varies between 1245 and
1685.6
 Establishment data: PS (Productiestatistieken). The establishment-level or plant-level dataset
is much larger than the rm-level dataset. Data is collected by Statistics Netherlands through
annual surveys. Establishments with 50 or more employees are represented each year, while
smaller rms are represented on the basis of a rotating annual sample. The probability that a
small establishment (<50 employees) is in the sample during a number of consecutive years is
therefore small.7 Because of statistical breaks in the time series we use data for the period
1999-2005. On average we have 15000 annual observations, about equally distributed between
manufacturing and services. The manufacturing data include all industrial sectors, while the
services data include mainly construction, transport and business services.
 General business register: ABR (Algemene Bedrijven Register). Statistics Netherlands uses this
database as the master le with it identies changes in the total population of Dutch rms and
production units. It also provides the basis for linking rm-level and establishment-level data.
The ABR together with the SFGO allow us to identify whether an establishment has foreign direct
investment or whether it is associated with a multinational rm.
We have constructed human capital indicators8 and performance indicators from the raw data. For
rm performance we use three indicators: (a) labour productivity dened as value added per full-time
6A detailed description of the SFGO database is presented in Rojas-Romagosa (2010).
7We have reduced the problem of a long under-represented tail in our data by putting the cut-o¤ size for inclusion in
the establishment-level dataset at ten employed persons. A further reason for this is that the export or FDI participation
is of less importance for these very small establishments. We only use questionnaire-based establishment data; entries
holding imputations by Statistics Netherlands were removed from our sample.
8Using the establishment-level data at the lowest level of detail, it was possible to construct an indicator for human-
capital intensity per worker. For the indicator we used the following exploitation sheet items: expenditure on R&D, patents
and licenses, internal education programs, costs of knowledge-intensive intermediary services (consultants, accountants),
travel and communication costs, ICT expenditure, and also earnings on establishment-level from patents, licenses,and
intra-company services charged to a¢ liated companies. The sum of these items is expressed per full-time employee.
The resulting indicator correlated strongly with wages per worker, which was available for a much larger sample of
establishments. We therefore used wages per worker as indicator of human capital use.
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worker; (b) sales per worker; and (c) protability, dened as gross value added minus wages and minus
depreciation.9
2.2 Export participation
To deal with export participation (i.e. whether the rm exports or not) we use data at the level of
individual establishments and data at the rm level. Both types of data show di¤erent aspects of rm
behaviour. A rm is a business unit of higher hierarchical order than an establishment. The rm
is considered as the actual economic agent in nancial processes (nancing, income generation). It
may have one or more establishments. The rm data are therefore closer to strategic decision making.
Decisions to engage in foreign direct investment are more likely to be taken at the rm level than at the
establishment level. The rm level data are also generally closer to legal and scal entities, even though
rms may be grouped by ownership ties into a rm group. Averaged over the period 1997-2005, 55% of
the rms is actively engaged in exports. It implies that 45% of these large rms does not export at all.
Table 1 shows that nine out of ten exporting rms have a multinational a¢ liation.10 About two-thirds
of MNEs also active in exports. If the latter rms are owned by a foreign multinational (17%), it may
imply that the Dutch subsidiary rm only concentrates on the domestic market. Some non-exporting
large rms are owned by a Dutch multinational, where substitution between direct investment and
exporting may play a role.
Table 1: Export participation by internationalisation type, percentages by rms and establishments
Dutch MNE Foreign MNE
Firm-level data (average 1997-2005)
Non-exporter 19    10 a) 17 45
Exporter 5 22 28 55
Total 24 32 45 100
Establishment-level data (average 1999-2005)
Non-exporter 50 5     0.4  b) 56
Exporter 33 11 0.7 44
Total 83 16 1.1 100
Notes: a) 39% of the non-exporting Dutch MNEs did not register their country of ownership. Some may be registered
abroad for tax reasons. b) The identification of ownership ties with multinational firms (especially for foreign
multinationals) is less precise than it is at the firm level. Many establishments associated with foreign multinationals
may be incorrectly classified as local establishments.
Source: Own calculations based on the SFGO and PS databases.
Without
multinational
affiliation
With multinational affiliation
Total
The establishment or plant is the lowest level of observation of economic units in the Dutch business
demography. In the denition by Statistics Netherlands, an establishment is characterised by relative
9At the rm level (SFGO) we have information on capital stocks and thus, we constructed a measure of TFP. The
results using thi variable are very similar to those using the other performance variables (cf. Rojas-Romagosa, 2010). At
the establishment level (PS) there was no information on capital that allowed us to construct a reliable TFP measure.
10The SFGO dataset includes an identifying variable for multinational rms. We rened the MNE identication by
adding the criterions that the rm should have an FDI stock of at least 100,000 euros, and that it either should have
foreign sales or intermediary inputs from foreign subsidiaries (cf. Rojas-Romagosa, 2010). In the establishment (PS)
dataset it is possible to identify Dutch-a¢ liated MNEs, but it is not possible to identify foreign a¢ liated MNEs in a
reliable way. This means that some local establishments may in reality be associated with very productive foreign MNEs.
Thus, when using the PS dataset MNEs refer to Dutch a¢ liated, while in the SFGO dataset MNEs refer to both Dutch
and foreign a¢ liated.
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independence in production or distribution, and it o¤ers its products to an external market. In economic
sense, the establishment data are relatively close to the production process. From Table 1 we observe
that there is a much larger proportion of establishments without multinational a¢ liation and of non-
exporters, than for the data at the rm-level.
At the establishment level we also make a distinction between manufacturing and services. Figure
1 di¤erentiates the export participation rate by size class. Export participation in manufacturing is
much larger than in services and steadily increases by size class, reaching a maximum of almost 100%
in the largest size class. The relation between establishment size and export participation is remarkably
di¤erent in services.11 First, the participation levels are much lower for services on average around
20%. Secondly, export participation for services rms peaks at size class 8 (500 to 999 employees).
Figure 1: Export participation by size class: number of exporting establishments as % share of all
establishments, 2005
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Notes: All establishments with 10 or more employed persons. The size codes are based on the number of
employed persons and cover the following intervals: 1: 10-19 employed persons; 2: 20-39; 3: 40-59; 4: 60-
80; 5: 80-124; 6: 125-249; 7: 250-499; 8: 500-999; 9: 1000-1999; 10: >2000 employed persons.
Source: Own calculations based on the PS database.
As similar pattern can be found for export intensity: the share of export in total sales. Table 2
shows that export intensity in manufacturing steadily increases from 27% in the smallest rms to 60%
in the largest. On the other hand, export intensity in services is much lower than in manufacturing and
it remains between 10% and 30% for all size classes.
Figure 2 shows that across all size classes, manufacturing establishments are more likely to be
associated with multinational rms than in services.12 Beyond size class 8 (500 to 999 employees)
multinational a¢ liation in services diminishes from 20 to 10% for the largest rms.
11For services we have data at the 4 digit industry level. The total number of observations by industry di¤ers by year.
Over the entire 1999-2005 period the industry breakdown of services observations was as follows: Construction 33%,
Retail and wholesale trade 11%, Hotels, restaurants and catering 10%, Transport 18%, Post and telecom 1%, Equipment
leasing services 2%, Computer and IT services 8%, and Business services 16%.
12Size classes for MNE are constructed using employment in The Netherlands (for which we have information) and not
to the total worldwide employment of the MNE.
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Table 2: Export intensity by size class: average share (%) of exports in total sales, establishments, 2005
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Manufacturing 28 27 37 38 44 49 48 49 56 60
Services 22 23 20 27 24 26 23 23 18 20
Size classes a)
Notes: a) All establishments with 10 or more employed persons. The size codes are based on the number of employed
persons and cover the following intervals: 1: 10-19 employed persons; 2: 20-39; 3: 40-59; 4: 60-80; 5: 80-124; 6: 125-249;
7: 250-499; 8: 500-999; 9: 1000-1999; 10: >2000 employed persons.
Source: Own calculations based on the PS database.
Figure 2: Establishments with MNE-a¢ liation as a percentage share of internationally active establish-
ments, by size class, 2005
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Notes: Internationally active establishments are defined as those establishments that have either exports or a
multinational affiliation. Size classes are defined as in Figure 1.
Sources: Own calculations based on PS, ABR and SFGO data.
2.3 Export concentration
The total distribution of exports is much more skewed than is the case for export participation, with the
largest exporters accounting for a disproportionately large share of total exports. Among our sample
of large rms the mean export intensity is 19%, but the median is only 2%. It indicates that exports
must be very much concentrated. This result also emerges at the establishment level.
The overwhelming majority of the largest exporters can be identied as being associated with multi-
national rms. Table 3 displays the export shares of the largest exporters. For instance, the top 5%
of largest manufacturing exporters represent 73% of total exports. The corresponding gure for service
exporters is 62%. The contribution of multinational-a¢ liated establishments is also reported. The table
shows that the concentration of exports in the hands of MNE-a¢ liated establishments is considerably
stronger in manufacturing than it is in services.
These stylised facts for the rm-level structure of Dutch exports conrm what has been found for
many other countries by now. Exports are highly concentrated; this holds both at rm level and at
establishment level. Compared to other countries the degree of concentration is not exceptional (cf.
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Table 3: Export concentration rates by cumulative share (%) of largest exporters, establishments, 2005
Top 1% Top 5% Top 10% Top 50%
Manufacturing establishments 50 73 83 99
of which: affiliated with Dutch  MNE 42 60 68 74
Services establishments 37 62 78 98
of which: affiliated with Dutch  MNE 16 26 31 34
Share (%) of largest exporters in
cumulative exports
Source: Own calculations based on the PS database.
Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007; International Study Group on Exports and Productivity, 2008). Multina-
tional rms account for most of the Dutch exports; many domestic rms do not export. Exports by
multinationals are much less important in services than they are in manufacturing.
The concentrated export structure has implications for the interpretation of short-term uctuations
in trade. The overwhelming role of the large all-time exporters means that a small uctuation in their
trade ow may outnumber the impact of entry and exit by many new (often small) export starters.
For total manufacturing we calculated that over the period 2000-2005 a 10% uctuation in the top-20%
largest exporters on average had the same e¤ect on Dutch manufacturing exports as the entry of 101
average export starters. This ratio di¤ers by industrial sector, depending on capital intensity and the
role of scale e¤ects.
2.4 Descriptive performance data by internationalisation type
Table 4 compares labour productivity (using both valued added and sales per worker), wages and gross
protability. We distinguish between establishments in four internationalisation groups: (a) locals with
only domestic sales, (b) exporters without multinational a¢ liation, (c) establishments with Dutch MNE
a¢ liation but without exports, (d) exporting establishments with Dutch multinational a¢ liation.
A rst comparison of productivity performance indicates that when disregarding other rm characteristics
there is a strictly monotonic performance hierarchy between the internationalisation groups. Dutch a¢ l-
iated multinational rms are substantially more productive than establishments that only export, both
in services and in manufacturing. This is true for both denitions of labour productivity. In addition,
value-added per worker of manufacturing exporters increases by internationalisation type. The produc-
tivity advantage of services exporters is also increasing by type of rm, but the di¤erences are smaller
than for manufacturing rms. When we use sales per worker as the labour productivity indicator, the
previous results do not hold for the services sector, where non-exporting MNEs are more productive
than exporting ones. Exporting rms (irrespective of MNE a¢ liation or not) are more productive than
non-exporting rms. In the following section we look at these productivity di¤erences when we use
econometric tests. Table 4 also shows a number of di¤erences in average wages and gross prots per
worker. MNEs tend to pay higher wages than non-multinationals, while prot are distinctively higher
for MNEs. Irrespective of MNE a¢ liation, exporters pay higher wages and earn bigger prots. For the
rm-level data we nd the same pattern that MNEs have higher values for both productivity measures,
wages and prots than non-MNEs (not reported).
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Table 4: Performance statistics by internationalisation group, establishments, pooled data, 1999-2005
Value Average
Number of added per Sales per wage per
Internationalisation group observations worker worker worker Gross profit a)
in €1000 in €1000 in €1000 in €1000
Manufacturing total b) 51,340 68.7 133.6 21.3 47.4
of which:
 a. domestic-oriented 15,196 56.9 98.8 19.4 37.5
 b. export only 23,644 67.6 132.1 21.1 46.5
 c. non-exporter, Dutch MNE affiliated 2,253 77.6 158.2 22.8 54.8
 d. exporter, Dutch MNE affiliated 9,482 90.0 202.8 24.3 65.7
Services total b) 52,144 55.9 91.3 20.0 35.9
of which:
 a. domestic-oriented 36,789 52.2 87.1 19.0 33.3
 b. export only 10,500 63.2 87.6 22.4 40.9
 c. non-exporter, Dutch MNE affiliated 3,013 71.8 158.0 23.5 48.3
 d. exporter, Dutch MNE affiliated 1,462 73.0 116.3 25.2 47.8
Total sample 103,484 62.3 112.3 20.6 41.6
Notes: a) The gross profit is calculated as valued added minus wages b) Manufacturing and services totals include firms (not shown) for which
foreign MNE affiliation could not be identified in a reliable way.
Source: Own calculations based on PS; for MNE identification we used information from ABR and SFGO databases.
3 Testing the links between productivity and exports
The dominant way of empirical testing the predictions of the heterogeneous-rms trade models is to
test through panel data regressions whether exporting rms have a signicant productivity performance
premium compared to non-exporters, when controlling for other export-invariant factors as well (cf.
Wagner, 2007).13 A positive exporter premium is indeed to be expected if positive self selection drives
the choice behaviour on the extensive export margin. However, we want to focus primarily on the choice
behaviour itself, rather than on the consequences of that behaviour. Thus, we use probit regressions as
our main econometric test for export participation decisions, while the common panel data regressions
that estimate the productivity premium are applied here as a robustness check.
3.1 The probability of becoming an exporter
The main prediction of the heterogeneous-rms trade model (cf. Melitz, 2003) is that rms opt for
exporting if their productivity is su¢ cient to absorb the xed entry costs in the export market. We
assume that actual export behaviour can be adequately described by a latent variable model in which
the preference of rm i in year t for exporting yit precedes actual exporting. We reinterpret the
heterogeneous-rms trade model in the following way. The decision to export yit depends on a set of
observable rm characteristics xit and on an unobserved characteristic "it (e.g. the sunk entry costs
rms expect to face in the export market). The main observable rm characteristics in xit are per-
13Given that we do not have international transaction data, to test the predictions of the Melitz model for The
Netherlands we need to impose the following assumptions: a) Firms in each sector (4-digit) have the same available
information about market size, xed and variable trade barriers, covering all relevant countries; b) All rms in a (4-digit)
sector have the same country set as (potential) export markets and (giving assumption a) have an identical ranking within
their set of preferred export countries; c) If rms in a (4-digit) sector decide to start exporting, they all enter the rst
country on their joint preference list, then all to the second country, etcetera.
9
formance characteristics (i.e. productivity, protability). The assumed distribution of the unobserved
characteristics "it determines the eventual export decision.
We assume that the rms preference for exporting yit 2 f1; 0g depends on a linear additive rela-
tionship between the vector of observed xit characteristics and the unobserved "it characteristic that
determine net export benets:
yit = xit + "it (1)
If the latent decision variable yit exceeds a certain threshold level, we assume that the rm exports.
14
Consequently, if ESit 2 f1; 0g is rm is export status in year t, we only observe ESit = 1 if yit > 0
and ESit = 0 otherwise. We formulate the following probability of exporting:
P fESit = 1g = P fyit > 0g = P fxit + "it > 0g = P f "it  xitg = F (xit) (2)
where F denotes the distribution function of  "it. Thus, we have obtained a binary choice model that
depends on the distribution of "it. As the scale of the rm preference yit is not identied, a normalisation
on the distribution of "it is required.15 Using a standard normal distribution, the binomial probit model
for the export decision is given by:
yit = xit + "it with "it  NID (0; 1) (3)
and :

yit = 1 if yit > 0
yit = 0 if yit  0
Based on the probit results we calculate impact elasticities. The (vector of) impact elasticities
@ ln(PfESit=1jxitg)
@ lnxit
gives the percentage change in the probability of a positive export preference after a
1% change in the log of rm characteristic xit.16 We rst analyze the most simple version of the probit
model with only one performance variable xit and all other possible impacts on the export decision
unspecied. Table 5 shows the marginal e¤ects of di¤erent performance variables. The general picture
is that the performance variables always have a statistically signicant impact on the export decision.
In manufacturing we nd a sensitivity for labour productivity and protability that is, respectively, 30
to 50% larger than in services.
We extend the probit model by adding control variables that may also a¤ect the export partic-
ipation decisions of establishments: size of the establishment, industry-specic e¤ects, lagged input
characteristics, a¢ liation with a multinational rm, and time shocks. The probit model now becomes:
P fESit = 1g = F (xit + Git  + Ri + Tt) (4)
14The threshold value can be set at zero without loss of generality.
15Usually this means that its variance is xed at a given value (Verbeek, 2004). Since F (xit) is also bounded between
0 and 1, it is plausible to choose a standard normal distribution (xit). There is no reason to expect that the standard
normal distribution does not apply.
16We present impact elasticities instead of marginal e¤ects @PfESit=1jxitg
@xit
, because the intuitive interpretation of
elasticities is easier. We evaluated point elasticities at the mean and median values of lnxit. Since di¤erences between
mean and median appeared to be very small we only report point elasticities at the mean.
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Table 5: Impact of performance on probability that an establishment exports: probit regressions, pooled
data, 1999-2005
Elasticity
Performance on export Standard Number of
indicator (in logs) Sub-sample probability a) errors z-value observations
Value added per worker Manufacturing 1.2290 0.028 43.99 *** 53,000
Services 2.323 0.067 34.82 *** 48,800
Profitability Manufacturing 1.385 0.021 66.40 *** 52,600
Services 1.895 0.046 40.95 *** 48,500
Source: Own calculations based on PS database.
Notes: a) Post-estimation calculations of the point elasticities evaluated at the means of the independent variables, using the
estimated probit model with clustered standard errors by 2-digit industry. Significance levels are coded as:  *** significance at
1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level.
where xit is the performance indicator (e.g. value-added per worker, protability), Git  is a vector
of rm characteristics (lagged  years to prevent multicollinearity problems with xit), which includes a
MNE dummy (the dummy has the value of one if the rm in year t  1 was a¢ liated to a multinational
company and zero otherwise), and a lagged indicator of the rms human capital (using the average
wage per worker in year t  3 as a proxy). Ri is a vector of time-invariant environment variables of the
rm, and Tt is a vector of year dummies. In the Ri vector we include 2-digit industry dummies and
the rms median size class over the entire interval that it is in our data panel.17 In the estimation we
account for the possibility of clustered standard errors by 2-digit industry.
The results for this extended probit model are presented in Table 6, covering pooled observations for
the period 1999-2005. The performance indicators in all cases have a statistically signicant marginal
e¤ect, even after controlling for a host of environment variables. We nd that a one per cent growth in
labour productivity would increase the probability of being an exporter by 0.82% in manufacturing and
by 1.4% in services. Indirectly, these results are consistent with theory prediction that xed or sunk
entry costs in export markets are important and lead to productivity self selection. For protability,
the impact elasticity is around 0.95% in both manufacturing and services.
Regarding the other variables, Table 6 suggests that after control for industry di¤erences the human
capital intensity is not a major condition for becoming an exporter. Human capital is only signicant in
the protability regression for services. The size of the establishment is a positive condition for becoming
an exporter in manufacturing, which indicates that xed costs and scale economies are important
there. Being part of a multinational rm is a factor that positively predicts export participation in
manufacturing, but not in services. Generally, the estimated probit model for manufacturing yields a
better prediction of the actual export participation.
3.2 Testing productivity premia for exporters and MNEs
In this section we run as a robustness check the standard econometric tests to nd export and MNE
productivity premia. In particular, we use panel-data regressions where we construct dummy variables
for the export status (ES) and the a¢ liation to a MNE of a rm, and include these dummies as
17The size class is measured on a 10-point Likert scale {1,..,10} that increases in employment size. We took the median
size category for the rm over the full observation period. The result is expressed as a natural logarithm.
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Table 6: Impact elasticities of performance on probability that an establishment exports: probit regres-
sions including control variables, pooled data, 1999-2005
Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services
Performance indicator (log) 0.819 *** 1.421 *** 0.955 *** 0.949 ***
Human capital indicator (log) 0.195 1.486 0.269 1.886 ***
Median size class (log) 0.243 *** 0.277 *** 0.051 0.053
MNE dummy 0.021 *** 0.007 0.017 *** 0.009
Industry dummies (2-digit) yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 20,200 13,200 20,100 13,200
Predicted ES it after probit
a) 0.71 0.23 0.71 0.23
Source: Own calculations based on PS database, combined with employment and MNE data from SFGO and ABR.
Profitability
Notes: Post-estimation calculations of the point elasticities evaluated at the means of the independent variables, using the
estimated probit model with clustered standard errors by 2-digit industry. Significance levels are coded as:  *** significance at
1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. a) This indicator gives the joint prediction power of the probit estimate, predicting
the probability that ESit=1.
 Value added per worker
an explanatory variable for the rms productivity levels. Productivity is the crucial performance
variable in the heterogeneous-rms trade models (Melitz, 2003; Baldwin, 2005). Exporters need a
higher productivity rate (than non-exporters) allowing them to absorb the xed or sunk entry costs in
the foreign market. Hence, exporters should have on average a positive performance premium compared
to non-exporters, all other things equal. We test the productivity performance premia in a number
of discrete steps, starting with the pooled data. We investigate whether the predicted productivity
premia for exporting and multinational rms indeed exist. And if they exist, whether such e¤ects can
possibly be explained away by controlling for various rm-specic, industry-specic or market-specic
factors. We check for all three of these control variables. To reduce possible endogeneity between export
participation and rm size, we use a set of size class dummies based on the rms median employment
size over the entire time span that the rm is present in the data panel. The extended model reads:
lnxit = + ESit +  MNEit + Git + Tt + "it (5)
where xit it the performance variable for rm i in period t, ESit is the rms exporter status, MNEit is
a dummy for a¢ liation with a multinational company, Git is a vector of environment control variables
(industry dummies, and dummies for period-median size class), Tt is a vector of year dummies to
control for time shocks, and "it is the error term.
The resulting extended performance-premium regression has been applied to both the rm-level
data and the establishment-level data, so as to allow further comparison. For the establishment-level
data, we use a weighted least square (WLS) estimator with sample-to-population expansion factors
as weights, so as to be able to account for non-response and under-representation of small rms with
less than 50 employees. Table 7 reports the results regarding the performance premia for rms and
establishments.
Exporters and MNE have signicant and large positive productivity premia in terms of value-added
per worker. The exporter labour productivity premia are all round 20% and signicant at the highest
condence level. MNE premia are all highly statistically signicant and between 14 and 23%. The latter
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Table 7: Exporter and MNE labour productivity (value-added per worker) premia, rm and
establishment-level, pooled data, 1999-2005
Internationalisation group Manufacturing Services
Exporters vs. non-exporters 23%  *** 20% *** 18% ***
MNE versus local firms 14%  *** 20% *** 24% ***
Number of observations 12,400 43,700 50,100
Sources: Own calculations based on the SFGO and PS database.
Establishment-level pooled data
(1999-2005) b)
Notes: The performance variable is the log of value added per worker. WLS regressions using clustered standard
errors by 2-digit industry. a) The G-vector contains 2-digit industry dummies interacted with dummies per period-
median size class of the firm. The MNE identifier refers to Dutch-owned and foreign-owned MNE. b) The G-vector
contains 4-digit industry dummies, and separate dummies for period-median size class of the establishment. The
MNE identifier solely refers to Dutch-owned MNE.
Firm-level pooled
data (2000-2005) a)
result is in line with the predictions of Helpman et al. (2004). The gap between the MNE premium
and exporter premium is particularly strong in services. In the reasoning of Helpman et al. (2004) it
indicates that sunk entry costs for FDI in services are stronger than in manufacturing.
3.2.1 Controlling for size composition
The heterogeneous-rms trade model predicts that exporter premia are probably more important for
small rms than for large rms, because xed market-entry costs are relatively more important for
smaller rms.18 In Table 8 we test this hypothesis by calculating the labour productivity premia for
four rm-size categories. The premium indeed appears to be largest for the two smallest size classes.
This suggests that scale e¤ects are important for exports and for setting up a foreign subsidiary.
Table 8: Exporter and MNE labour productivity (value-added per worker) premia, rm-level pooled
data, di¤erentiated by rm size, 2000-2005 a)
Value-added per worker by size class (employed persons)
Internationalisation group 1-49 empl. 50-249 empl. 250-499 empl. >500 empl.
Exporters vs. non-exporters 26%*** 107%*** 28%*** 16%*** 20%***
MNE versus local firms 20%*** 54%*** 28%*** 16%*** 8%***
Number of observations 12,400 800 4,300 3,100 4,200
Sources: Own calculations based on the SFGO database.
Value-added per
worker, all firms b)
Notes: a) Panel regression over pooled SFGO dataset, using sample-to-population expansion factors as weights. All productivity variables measured
in logs. Control variables: 2-digit sector, size class dummies, and year dummies. b) The “ all firms” labour productivity premia differ somewhat from
those in Table 7 because the exporter dummy and the MNE dummy are applied independently from each other rather than together in one regression
equation.
For the establishment data we did similar regressions by size-class with a more rened, 10-point
size-class scale. The labour productivity premia of exporters in the two largest size classes (1000+
employees) generally were not statistically signicant, possibly because of limited sample size. The
performance premia are largest (30% or more) for the smallest size classes and that they decrease with
establishment size. Beyond a threshold of 250 employed persons we found few signicant export premia.
18For instance, Kneller and Pisu (2007) report for British rms that exports impact mostly on the size of the rm and
only to a more limited extent on productivity.
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3.2.2 Controlling for xed e¤ects
After checking whether exporter and MNE premia are caused by input-specic and market-specic
factors, we test whether such premia are perhaps caused by special characteristics of individual rms and
establishments, such as management capacity, innovativeness of the work force or geographic location.
To control for such inuences, we consider the data in a panel dimension and add rm-specic (or
establishment-specic) xed e¤ects.19 This means that one of the annual observation per rm (or
establishment) is sacriced as a constant reference over time.
The panel dimension of the large-rm data is much better than the establishment data, since the
majority of rms is surveyed annually in the dataset. Tables 9 presents the rm-level xed e¤ects
regression results. It shows that the exporter premium is signicant and positive for value added per
worker, but not for sales per worker. The MNE premium is signicant and positive for both productivity
criteria.
Table 9: Firm-level labour productivity premia when controlling for xed e¤ects: panel regressions,
1997-2005
Internationalisation group
Exporters vs. non-exporters 6.2% *** 1.8%
MNE versus local firms 4.2% *** 4.4% *
Number of observations 12,400 12,400
Number of firms 2,400 2,400
R2 adjusted 0.27 0.18
Sources: Own calculations based on the SFGO database.
Value-added per
worker
Notes: Panel regressions with firm-level fixed effects, dummies for years, size, and 2-digit industry.
Productivity indicators are in logs. Significance levels: *** significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level,
and * at 10% level. Premium calculated as 100*[ exp(β) -1].
Sales per worker
Table 10 displays the results for the establishment-level data. The productivity premium of MNE-
linked establishments evaporates. Apparently, the MNE premium is related to other characteristics
of these establishments than to export participation decisions. Conversely, for exporters we still nd
signicant and substantial positive performance premia for labour productivity. The results are statis-
tically signicant at the highest condence level even though they explain just a small part of variance
in the data (i.e. there is a low R2).
It is interesting to note the di¤erence between the establishment-level and rm-level results for the
MNE performance premium. However, recall that the rm-level dataset allows a much better identi-
cation of links with foreign-owned rms, while the establishment data only allows for the identication
of links with Dutch-owned multinationals.
To sum up, the most important conclusions from this section are that, throughout the total popu-
lation of rms and establishments:
 Exporters are robustly more productive than non-exporting units. These results are not condi-
tional on other factors such as industry, input choices, market characteristics, and xed e¤ects
specic for the individual rm or establishment.
19We use xed e¤ects estimated as deviations from the time series mean.
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Table 10: Establishment-level labour productivity premia when controlling for xed e¤ects: panel
regressions, 1999-2005
Internationalisation group Manufacture Services
Exporters vs. non-exporters 3.3% *** 2.2% ***
MNE versus local firms 0.1% -2.6%
Number of observations 51,247 47,934
Number of firms 13,058 20,559
R2 adjusted 0.001 0.001
Sources: Own calculations based on the SFGO database.
Notes: Panel regressions with establishment-level fixed effects, dummies for years, size, and 2-
digit industry. Productivity indicator is in logs. Significance levels: *** significance at 1% level, ** at
5% level, and * at 10% level. Premium calculated as 100*[ exp(β) -1].
Value added per worker
 The exporter productivity premia are only found for establishments up to an employment size of
250 employees. This means that the exporter premia are scale-related, which is consistent with
the presence of sunk entry costs in foreign markets.
 MNE performance premia at the establishment level disappear when we consider rm-specic
characteristics. In manufacturing, the MNE performance premium is no longer statistically sig-
nicant. This means that rm-specic characteristics like management capabilities, innovativeness
of the work force, and geographic location are more decisive than the exporter status of the es-
tablishment. However, it should be kept in mind that in our large-rm sample, MNEs still have a
higher productivity, even when rm-specic characteristics are taken into consideration. A possi-
ble explanation is that the manufacturing MNE-premium is based mainly in headquarter services
that are less well captured at the establishment level.
4 The role of market structure in export performance
Chaney (2008) extends the heterogenous rms trade model of Melitz (2003) to include the role of mar-
ket structure. It can be derived from the Chaney (2008) model that a rm in homogeneous markets
(high substitution elasticity between products) needs a bigger performance premium to enter an export
market. Conversely, exporter premia are predicted to be lower in markets with more product di¤er-
entiation. We test this hypothesis by splitting the samples in two parts on the basis of competition
characteristics. The heterogeneous products group is made up of industries with strong product dif-
ferentiation and low substitution elasticity. The homogeneous products group is characterised by weak
product di¤erentiation and high substitution elasticity.
The distinctive criterion for product homogeneity is based on the idea that in an industry with
homogeneous products, competition will have mainly the character of price and cost competition. In-
e¢ cient rms with low productivity will then either shrink or drop out and more e¢ cient rms will
survive and grow. As a result of these movements, the dispersion of productivities in such homogeneous-
products industries will be lower than average for all industries. Conversely, in industries with more
di¤erentiated products the competitive process is driven less by price and cost competition, and we
expect more than average dispersion of productivities. Using these insights we calculated the dispersion
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of rm productivities in each 4-digit industry. The homogeneous productsdummy was set to 1 if the
variation coe¢ cient of value added per worker over the entire observation period was less than 75% of
the average for manufacturing and services, and set to 0 otherwise.
According to this criterion, about two-thirds of manufacturing and services establishments were
found to operate in homogeneous products industries. With the split samples we estimated again the
full probit regression model from equation (4). For brevity, we only give the estimated parameters and
the number of observations in Table 11:
Table 11: Impact elasticities of performance on probability that an establishment exports: probit
regressions including market structure indicator, pooled data, 1999-2005
Homogeneous
Products
Heterogeneous
Products
Homogeneous
Products
Heterogeneous
Products
Value added per worker (log) 0.827 *** 0.744 ** 3.549 *** 1.051 ***
Human capital indicator (log)      0.024 0.398 *** 1.851 0.781
Median size class (log) 0.264 *** 0.195 *** 0.293 *** 0.202 ***
MNE dummy 0.011 0.049 *** 0.030 -0.011
Industry dummies (2-digit) yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 14,678 5,522 7,161 6,057
Predicted ES it after probit
a) 0.07 0.73 0.20 0.20
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.02
Source: Own calculations based on PS database, combined with employment and MNE data from SFGO and ABR.
Services
Notes: Post-estimation calculations of the point elasticities evaluated at the means of the independent variables, using the estimated
probit model with clustered standard errors by 2-digit industry. Significance levels are coded as:  *** significance at 1% level, ** at 5%
level, and * at 10% level. a) This indicator gives the joint prediction power of the probit estimate, predicting the probability that ESit=1.
Manufacture
The results are consistent with the predictions of the Chaney (2008) model: both for manufacturing
and for services we nd that exporters in homogeneous-product industries have higher productivity
elasticities than those in heterogeneous-products industries. This suggests that self selection in indus-
tries with strong cost and price competition is based on productivity as major selection parameter. The
strongest di¤erence is found in services. For heterogeneous services, the elasticity of labour productivity
on the probability of being an exporter is less than one-third compared to the homogeneous services.
After splitting the sample, we now nd that establishment size is important at the highest condence
level in all regressions, suggesting that xed entry costs a¤ect scale economies. Multinational a¢ liation
and human capital intensity are only a positive predictors of export starting for heterogenous-products
industries in manufacturing. Overall, these results suggests that the type of sunk entry costs in foreign
markets may di¤er by industry.
5 Self-selection into foreign markets
So far we tested for static productivity premia in the pooled datasets, which include all-time exporters,
new exporters and non-exporters. However, these estimations do not deal with time-dependent behav-
iour that is crucial to test the self-selection hypothesis. This hypothesis can be tested by assessing the
pre-export performance di¤erences of export starters and non-exporters. According to the heteroge-
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neous rms theory, a rm self-selects into export participation on the basis of its relative performance in
the domestic market. This implies that even before export starts we should nd a positive performance
premium.
This can be tested by using a modied version of the probit analysis of equation (4) where we use
the past performance of rms xt  (instead of the present performance) and where we drop the all-time
exporters from our dataset and focus on the new exporters. Thus, the equation being regressed is:
P fESit = 1g = F (xit  + Git  + Ri + Tt) (6)
New exporters are identied as rms that started exporting during our data period (1999-2006) and
that did not have exports in the  years before export start in year t. The latter condition excludes
the incidental or on-o¤exporters.20 We compare the set of new exporters with non-exporting rms
that neither had exports in the year t nor in period t   . This sample selection implies that we lose
many observations and are left with only small samples of export starters each year. The number of
observations decreases with the length of the lead period . We experimented with lead periods of one,
two and three years. Table 12 gives the results for the ex-ante probit self-selection model.
Table 12: Impact elasticities of ex-ante performance on probability that an establishment exports in
period t-q: probit regressions, pooled data, 1999-2006
Manufacture Services Manufacture Services
Performance indicator, 3 years before 2.804 *** 0.452 2.771 *** -0.612
   Number of observations 3,783 4,607 3,753 4,590
   Number of export starters 387 297 387 297
   Predicted ES it after probit
a)
0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05
Performance indicator, 2 years before 1.929 *** 0.705 1.628 ** 0.281
   Number of observations 6,376 8,611 6,337 8,572
   Number of export starters 797 724 797 724
   Predicted ES it after probit
a)
0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06
Performance indicator, 1 year before 0.084 *** 1.692 ** 0.056 *** 1.288 ***
   Number of observations 6,991 9,718 6,949 9,675
   Number of export starters 1,332 627 1,332 627
   Predicted ES it after probit
a)
0.15 0.05 0.15 0.05
Source: Own calculations using the PS database.
Profitability
Notes: Post-estimation calculations of the marginal effects at the means of the independent variables, using the estimated probit model with
clustered standard errors by 2-digit industry. Significance levels are coded as:  *** significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10%
level.  Includes control variables: human capital indicator, size class, and industry (2-digit) and year dummies. a) This indicator gives the
joint prediction power of the probit estimate, predicting the probability that ESit=1.
 Value added per worker
A clear result is that the probability of exporting depends positively on the ex-ante labour produc-
tivity and protability performance, conrming the prediction of the self-selection model. The evidence
for dynamic self selection is strongest in manufacturing. The labour productivity and protability of
manufacturing in year t  3 is a good predictor for export start in year t. A 1% higher labour produc-
tivity in the year t  3 yields a 2.8% higher probability of a positive export decision in year t, and for
the year t  1 the elasticity is only 0:08%. The ex-ante productivity 3 years before is therefore a better
20To prevent the inclusion of on-o¤ exporters in the case of theta=1, we added the additional restriction that the
exporter starters remain active in exporting in t+1, even though this diminished the size of the sample.
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predictor than productivity in later years. In services, only productivity and protability in year t  1
can signicantly predict export start. The pattern for protability as performance indicator is likewise.
We also did robustness test for ex-ante performance premia using the more common panel regression
formulation:
lnxit  = + XSit + Git + Tt + "it (7)
where the productivity indicator is taken  years before the rms begins to export (XS) and the pre-
export performance premium for exporters can be derived from . In Table 13 we report the results of
the panel regression with our large-rms dataset, which is limited by the relatively small sample size
that only allows using a 2-year pre-start observation window. In spite of the small number of export
starters we nd a signicant and positive productivity advantage of rms two years before they start
exporting.21
Table 13: Dynamic panel regressions for productivity premium 2 years before export start, rm-level
SFGO sample, 1997-2005
Exporter starter premium 12.2% * 8.9% *
Number of observations 2,100 12,400
R2 adjusted 0.30 0.34
Sources: Own calculations based on the SFGO database.
Value-added per
worker
Notes:Includes dummy control variables for years, size class, and 2-digit industry. Productivity
indicators are in logs. Significance levels: *** significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10%
level. Exporter starter premium calculated as 100*(exp(β) -1).
Sales per worker
Summarizing these results, our estimations clearly support the self-selection hypothesis that export
starters have a signicant productivity advantage with respect to non-exportersbefore they begin to
export.
6 Learning-by-exporting and distance to the technological fron-
tier
Empirical studies in the 1980s and 1990s used to explain the fact that exporters were more productive
than non-exporters due to the learning experiences of exporters.22 Although we nd strong evidence
in favour of the self-selection hypothesis, we cannot exclude that ex-post learning-by-exporting is a
supplementary explanation for productivity premia by exporting rms, certainly when dynamic learning
e¤ects are taken into account.
We tested empirically for the general existence of learning-by-exporting e¤ects. For this we consid-
ered a sample of establishments from which the all-time exporters have been removed. We focus on the
establishments that started exporting during the observation period (1999-2005) and we compare their
productivity performance with that of similar establishments that did not export. Export starters are
21We nd similar results at the establishment-level, which are not reported here.
22E.g. World Bank (1993; 1997) Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Evenson and Westphal (1995).
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those establishments that start exports in year t and did not export during the two years before export
start. We evaluate their labour productivity growth during 1, 2 and 3 years after export starts.
We found, however, no empirical support for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. This result
holds for every time lag, for both rm and establishment-level databases, and for the manufacturing
and services sub-samples.23
Although we nd no general export-learning e¤ect on productivity, it can be that the learning-
by-exporting e¤ects are conditional on the export destination market. In particular, the destination
countrys distance to the international productivity frontier. The inclusion of this variable would give
support to the insight that learning-by-exporting is conditional on export destination (De Loecker,
2007; Pisu, 2008). A neglect of considering the learning potential by export destination might explain
why most country studies fail to nd signicant learning-by-exporting e¤ects. To correct for learning
potential we constructed an international productivity frontier, based on value added per worked hour
for the 2-digit industry level. We use labour productivity (value-added per worker) as the key variable
based on data from the EUKLEMS productivity database. It contains internationally harmonised data
for 60 industries for a group of 17 major developed countries, most of them in the OECD. We construct
the industry-level international frontier over this 17-country horizon. Secondly, after converting the
national data into PPP dollars it is possible to identify by year and industrythe frontier country with
the highest value added per worked hour. Finally, after identifying the frontier country, we calculated
for the rest of the countries the relative gap compared to the frontier country. Both the frontier and
the frontier gaps move over the years.
As an illustration Figure (3) in the Appendix provides the percentage distance of Dutch industries
to the international labour productivity frontier and the shifts in this gap between 1995 and 2003. The
only services industry for which The Netherlands held an international frontier position in 1995 was the
insurance and pension fund sector (NACE 66). In that year the frontier gap was therefore zero, but in
2003 this industry had become less competitive in productivity and at a distance of ten per cent from
the new frontier country. For manufacturing industry, ve Dutch industries held international frontier
positions in 2003.
We then re-run the panel data regressions with a control variable that quanties an establishments
distance to the international productivity frontier. The results are negative: even when controlling for
the learning potential we nd no signicant learning-by-exporting productivity gain for rms. Even
though some studies report learning e¤ects for relatively backward export starters Besedes and Prusa
(2006) and Albornoz et al. (2009) we cannot conrm this for the Netherlands.
7 Conclusions
This paper has been guided by two research targets. Firstly, to produce a descriptive analysis of the rm-
level structure of Dutch exports and the distinctive characteristics of exporting rms and multinational
rms active in the Dutch markets. Such data have recently come available for a range of countries
and we sketched the corresponding picture of stylised facts for The Netherlands. We nd that Dutch
exporting rms follow the now standard results of the heterogeneous-rm literature: exporting rms are
more productive, larger and pay higher wages than non-exporting rms. Moreover, exports are highly
23These results are reported in Kox et al. (2010).
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concentrated in a few large exporting rms. The concentrated export structure has implications for the
interpretation of short-term uctuations in trade. The overwhelming role of the large all-time exporters
means that a small uctuation in their trade ow may outnumber the impact of entry and exit by many
new (often small) export starters.
Secondly, we want to establish what is behind these stylised facts. We investigate econometrically
whether the self-selection hypothesis and other predictions from the heterogeneous-rms trade models
can explain the patterns we nd in Dutch exports. Our results nd strong support for the self-selection
hypothesis, where initial higher productivity levels allow rms to cover the initial sunk trade costs and
self-select into becoming an exporter. We also test whether the learning-by-exporting hypothesis o¤ers
a complementary explanation for the export-productivity link. We nd no empirical support for the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis, not even after controlling for the rms distance to a constructed
international productivity frontier. This latter result may be important for the motivation of future
export promotion policies.
Throughout our empirical estimates, we use probit regressions as an alternative way to test whether
productivity levels increase the probability of becoming an exporter. These probit regressions are
complemented by the standard OLS panel regression estimates.
Finally, we test wether the productivity-export link is altered if we consider an indicator for sectoral
market structure. We nd that services sectors with high competition, and thus, lower product di¤er-
entiation have a signicantly higher export productivity premia than rms in less competitive sectors.
Such di¤erences are not found in the manufacturing sector.
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A Appendix
Figure 3: Percentage distance of Dutch industries to the international labour productivity frontier
(specied by industry and by year based on average value added per hour worked, PPP constant), 1995
and 2003
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Notes: Industry codes services. 40-41: electricity, gas and water supply; 45: construction; 50: sale, maintenance and
repair of motor vehicles, fuel sales; 51: wholesale trade; 52: retail trade; repair of household goods; 60-63: transport and
storage services; 64: post and telecom; 65-67: banking, insurance and financial services; 70: real estate; 71: renting of
equipment; 72: computer and IT services; 73: contract research; 740-748: other business services.
Industry codes manufacturing: 15-16: food, drink and tobacco; 17: textiles; 18: clothing; 20: leather and footwear; 21:
wooden products; 22: pulp & paper products; 23: printing & publishing; 24: min. oil refining, coke & nuclear fuel; 24:
chemicals; 25: rubber & plastics; 26: non-metallic mineral products; 27: basic metals; 28: fabricated metal products; 29:
mechanical engineering; 30: office machinery; 310-312: other electrical machinery and apparatus nes; 313: insulated wire;
321: electronic valves and tubes; 322: telecom equipment; 323: radio and television receivers; 331: scientific instruments;
3300-09: other instruments; 34: motor vehicles; 351: shipbuilding; 353: aircraft and spacecraft; 352-9: other transport
equipment; 36+37: Furniture, miscellaneous manufacturing; recycling.
Sources: Own calculations based on EUKLEMS data (GGDC).
23
